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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the impact of phase noise
on the secrecy performance of downlink massive MIMO systems in
the presence of a passive multiple-antenna eavesdropper. Thereby,
for the base station (BS) and the legitimate users, the effect
of multiplicative phase noise is taken into account, whereas the
eavesdropper is assumed to employ ideal hardware. We derive a
lower bound for the ergodic secrecy rate of a given user when
matched filter data precoding and artificial noise transmission are
employed at the BS. Based on the derived analytical expression,
we investigate the impact of the various system parameters on
the secrecy rate. Our analytical and simulation results reveal that
distributively deployed local oscillators (LOs) can achieve a better
performance than one common LO for all BS antennas as long as
a sufficient amount of power is assigned for data transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems
promise tremendous performance gains in terms of network
throughput and energy efficiency by employing simple coherent
processing across arrays of hundreds or even thousands of
base station (BS) antennas, serving tens or hundreds of mobile
terminals [1], [2]. As an additional benefit, massive MIMO is
inherently more secure than conventional MIMO systems, as
the large-scale antenna array equipped at the BS (Alice) can
accurately focus a narrow and directional information beam on
the intended terminals (Bob), such that the received signal power
at Bob is several orders of magnitude higher than that at any
incoherent passive eavesdropper (Eve) [3]. Unfortunately, this
benefit may vanish if Eve also employs a massive antenna array
for eavesdropping. In this case, unless additional measures to
secure the communication are taken by Alice, even a single
passive Eve is able to intercept the signal intended for Bob [4].
Since security is a critical concern for future communication
systems, facilitating secrecy at the physical layer of massive
MIMO systems has received significant attention recently. Ar-
tificial noise (AN) generation [5] was employed to provide
physical layer security in a multi-cell massive MIMO system
with pilot contamination in [4]. Thereby, it was shown that secure
communication can be achieved even with simple matched filter
(MF) precoding of the data and null-space (NS) precoding of the
AN. Nevertheless, it was revealed in [6] that significant additional
performance gains are possible with more sophisticated data
and AN precoders, including polynomial precoders. Furthermore,
AN-aided jamming of Rician fading massive MIMO channels
was investigated in [7].
All aforementioned works on secure massive MIMO are based
on the assumption that the transceivers of the legitimate users are
equipped with perfect hardware components, i.e., the effects of
hardware impairments were not taken into account. Nevertheless,
all practical implementations do suffer from impairments arising
from non-ideal hardware components [8]. These impairments
are expected to be particularly pronounced in massive MIMO
systems as the excessive number of BS antennas makes the use of
low-cost components desirable to keep the overall capital expen-
ditures for operators manageable. Several works have investigated
the impact of hardware impairments on massive MIMO systems
[8]- [11]. These works demonstrated that hardware impairments
can severely limit the performance of massive MIMO systems,
and that phase noise originating from free-running oscillators
is the main contributor in degrading the quality of the channel
state information (CSI) estimates needed for precoder design. On
the one hand, phase noise causes the CSI estimates to become
outdated more quickly, and on the other hand, it may cause a loss
of orthogonality of the pilot sequences employed by the different
users in a cell for uplink training. If communication secrecy is
considered, an additional challenge arises: Whereas the legitimate
users of the system will likely employ low-cost equipment giving
rise to hardware impairments, the eavesdropper is expected to
employ high-quality equipment and avoid hardware impairments.
This disparity in equipment quality was not considered in the
related work on physical layer security [4]- [7] nor in the related
work on hardware impairments [8]- [11] and necessitates the
development of a new analysis and design framework.
Motivated by the above considerations, in this paper, we
present the first study of physical layer security for massive
MIMO systems in the presence of phase noise. Thereby, we
focus on the downlink and investigate the effects of multiplicative
phase noise at the BS and the users. As a worst-case scenario,
the eavesdropper is assumed to employ ideal (phase noise-free)
hardware. We derive a tight lower bound for the ergodic secrecy
rate achieved by a downlink user in the presence of phase noise
when MF data precoding and NS AN precoding are employed
at the massive MIMO BS. The derived bound provides insight
into the impact of various system and channel parameters, such
as the phase noise variance, the amount of power allocated to
the AN, the number of users, and the number of deployed local
oscillators (LOs) on the ergodic secrecy rate.
Notation: Superscripts T and H stand for the transpose and
conjugate transpose, respectively. IN is the N -dimensional iden-
tity matrix. The expectation operation of a random variable is
denoted by E[·]. diag{x} denotes a diagonal matrix with the
elements of vector x on the main diagonal. Cm×n represents
the space of all m× n matrices with complex-valued elements.
x ∼ CN(0N ,Σ) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian vector x ∈ CN×1 with zero mean and covariance matrix
Σ. [A]kl denotes the element in the kth row and lth column of
matrix A. Finally, [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
The considered massive MIMO system model comprises an
N -antenna BS, K single-antenna mobile terminals (MTs), and
an NE-antenna eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is passive in
order to hide its existence from the BS and the MTs. Similar to
[9], [11], we assume that after proper compensation the residual
hardware impairments manifest themselves at the BS and the
MTs in the form of multiplicative phase noise. The impact of the
phase noise on uplink training and downlink data transmission
is investigated in Sections II-A and II-B, respectively, and the
signal model for the eavesdropper is presented in Section II-C.
A. Uplink Pilot Training under Phase Noise
In massive MIMO systems, the CSI is usually acquired via up-
link training by exploiting the channel reciprocity between uplink
and downlink [2]. As such, in the training phase (the beginning
of each coherence block of length T ), all MTs emit mutually
orthogonal pilot sequences ωk = [ωk(1), ωk(2), . . . , ωk(B)]T ∈
CB×1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K of length B (B ≥ K). We have ωHk ωk′ =
Bpτ for k′ = k, and ωHk ωk′ = 0 otherwise. The received vector
ytr(t) ∈ CN×1, 1 ≤ t ≤ B, at the BS is given by
ytr(t) =
K∑
k=1
Θk(t)gkωk(t) + ξ
UL(t). (1)
Here, the channel vector of the kth MT, gk ∼ CN(0N , βkIN ),
is modelled as block Rayleigh fading, where βk denotes
the path-loss. Thereby, gk is assumed to be constant during
coherence time T and change independently afterwards.
ξUL(t) ∼ CN(0, ξUL) denotes the thermal noise at the
BS. In (1), the term Θk(t) characterizes the phase noise
affecting the uplink training, and is given by Θk(t) =
diag
(
ejθ
1
k(t)11×N/No , . . . , e
jθNo
k
(t)11×N/No
)
∈ CN×N , where
No denotes the number of free-running LOs equipped at the
BS [9]. Thereby, we assume that at the BS each group of
N/No ∈ Z antennas is connected to one free-running LO.
θlk(t) = ψl(t) + φk(t) is the phase noise that affects the link
between the lth LO at the BS and the kth MT. Adopting the
discrete-time Wiener phase noise model [9], in time interval
t, the phase noises at the lth LO of the BS and the kth MT
are modelled as ψl(t) ∼ CN(ψl(t − 1), σ2ψ), 1 ≤ l ≤ No, and
φk(t) ∼ CN(φk(t − 1), σ2φ), 1 ≤ k ≤ K , where σ2ψ and σ2φ are
the phase noise (increment) variances at the BS and the MTs,
respectively.
For channel estimation, we collect the signal vectors received
during the training phase in vector ψ = [yTtr(1), . . . ,yTtr(B)]T ∈
CBN×1, and define the effective channel vector at time t as
gk(t) = Θk(t)gk . With these definitions, the linear minimum
mean-square error (LMMSE) estimate of the channel of the kth
MT at time t (i.e., during the data transmission phase) can be
written as [10]
gˆk(t) =
(
βkω
H
k Θσ(t)Σ
−1 ⊗ IN
)
ψ, (2)
where
Θσ(t) = diag
(
e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2 |t−1|, . . . , e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2 |t−B|
)
(3)
and Σ =
∑K
k=1 βkWk + ξ
ULIB with [Wbk]i,j =
ωk(i)ω
∗
k(j)e
−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2 |i−j|, i, j ∈ {1, . . .B}.
Considering the properties of LMMSE estimation, the channel
can be decomposed as gk(t) = gˆk(t) + e(t), t = 1, . . . , B,
where gˆk(t) denotes the LMMSE channel estimate given in (2)
and ek(t) represents the estimation error. gˆk(t) and e(t) are
mutually uncorrelated and have zero mean [8, Theorem 1]. The
error covariance matrix is given by
E[ek(t)e
H
k (t)] = βk
(
1− βkωHk Θσ(t)Σ−1Θσ(t)ωk
)
IN . (4)
Eqs. (1)-(4) reveal that, in general, for σ2ψ, σ2φ > 0, the channel
estimate of the kth MT contains contributions from channels
of other MTs, i.e., pilot contamination occurs although the
emitted pilots are orthogonal. Furthermore, (2) reveals that the
channel estimate depends on time t. As a consequence, ideally,
the channel-dependent data and AN precoders employed for
downlink transmission should be recomputed for every symbol
interval of the data transmission phase, which entails a high
computational complexity. Therefore, in the following, we as-
sume that the data and AN precoders are computed based on the
channel estimate for one symbol interval t0 (e.g. t0 = B + 1)
and are then employed for precoding during the entire data
transmission phase, i.e., for t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T }. For notational
conciseness, we denote the corresponding channel estimate by
gˆk = gˆk(t0), k = {1, . . .K}.
B. Downlink Data Transmission and Linear Precoding
Assuming channel reciprocity, during the downlink data trans-
mission phase, the received signal at the kth MT in time interval
t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T } is given by
yDLk (t) = g
H
k Θ
H
k (t)x + ξ
DL
k (t), (5)
where ξDLk (t) ∼ CN(0, ξDL) represents the thermal noise at
the kth MT. The downlink transmit signal x ∈ CN×1 in (5)
is modeled as
x =
√
pFs+
√
qAz ∈ CN×1, (6)
where the data symbol vector s ∈ CK×1 and the AN vector
z ∈ CL×1, L ≤ N , are multiplied by data precoder F ∈ CN×K
and AN precoder A ∈ CN×L, respectively. As we assume
that the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the BS, AN is
injected to degrade the eavesdropper’s ability to decode the data
intended for the MTs [4], [6], [12]. Thereby, it is assumed that the
components of s and z are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random
variables, i.e., s ∼ CN(0K , IK) and z ∼ CN(0L, IL). In (6),
p = φPT /K and q = (1 − φ)PT /L denote the power assigned
to each MT and each column of the AN, where PT is the total
power budget and φ ∈ (0, 1] can be used to strike a balance
between data transmission and AN emission. Combining (6) and
(5) we obtain yDLk (t) =
√
pgHk (t)fksk +
K∑
l 6=k
√
pgHk (t)flsl+
√
qgHk (t)Az+ ξ
DL
k (t), (7)
where sk and fk denote the kth element of s and the kth column
of matrix F, respectively.
C. Signal Model of the Eavesdropper
We assume that the eavesdropper is silent during the training
phase, i.e., for t ∈ {1, . . . , B}, and eavesdrops the signal intended
for the kth MT during the data transmission phase, i.e., for
t ∈ {B+1, . . . , T }. Let GE denote the channel matrix between
the BS and the eavesdropper with i.i.d. zero-mean complex
Gaussian elements having variance βE , where βE is the path-
loss between the BS and the eavesdropper. Since the capabilities
of the eavesdropper are not known at the BS, we make worst-
case assumptions regarding the hardware and signal processing
capabilities of the eavesdropper with respect to communication
secrecy. In particular, we assume the received signal at the
eavesdropper at time t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T } can be modelled as
yE(t) = G
H
EΨ
H(t)x ∈ CNE×1, (8)
where Ψ(t) = diag
(
ejψ1(t)1T1×N/No, . . . , e
jψNo (t)1T1×N/No
)
.
Thereby, we assumed that the eavesdropper employs high-quality
hardware such that the only hardware impairment is the phase
noise at the BS. Eq. (8) also implies that the thermal noise at
the eavesdropper is negligibly small [4], [6], [12]. Furthermore,
we assume that the eavesdropper has perfect CSI, i.e., it perfectly
knows the effective eavesdropper channel matrix GHEΨ
H(t). We
also assume that it can can perfectly decode and cancel the
interference caused by all MTs except for the MT of interest
[4], [6], [12]. These worst-case assumptions lead to an upper
bound on the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper given by
CE = E[log2(1 + γE)], γE = pg
k
E
(
qGHEAA
HGE
)−1
(gkE)
H ,
(9)
where gkE = fHk GE . We note that since we assumed that the
thermal noise at the receiver of the eavesdropper is negligible,
γE , and consequently CE , are independent of the path-loss of the
eavesdropper, βE . Furthermore, since perfect channel estimation
at the eavesdropper was assumed, the impact of the phase noise
is completely removed.
III. ACHIEVABLE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE IN THE
PRESENCE OF PHASE NOISE
In this section, we analyze the achievable ergodic secrecy rate
of a massive MIMO system in the presence of phase noise. To
this end, we derive a lower bound on the achievable ergodic
secrecy rate in Section III-A, and present an asymptotic analysis
for the downlink data rate of the legitimate MTs when MF
data precoding and NS AN precoding are adopted by the BS
in Section III-B. In Section III-C, a simple closed-form upper
bound for the eavesdropper’s capacity is presented.
A. Lower Bound on Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Before analyzing the secrecy rate, we first employ [10, Lemma
1] to obtain a lower bound on the achievable rate of the multiple-
input single-output (MISO) phase noise channel given by (5). In
particular, the achievable rate of the kth MT, 1 ≤ k ≤ K , in
symbol interval t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T } is lower bounded by
Rk(t) ≥ Rk(t) = log2(1 + γk(t)), (10)
with signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) γk(t) given
in (11) at the top of the next page. The expectation operator
in (11) is taken with respect to channel vectors, gk, as well
as the phase noise processes, ψl(t) and φk(t). The SINR in
(11) is obtained by employing the average effective channel gain∣∣E [gHk (t)fk]∣∣ for signal detection, while treating the deviation
from the average effective channel gain as Gaussian noise having
variance E
[∣∣gHk (t)fk∣∣2
]
− |E [gHk (t)fk] |2. Moreover, following
[10, Lemma 1], we treated the multiuser interference as indepen-
dent Gaussian noise, which is a worst-case assumption for the
calculation of the mutual information. Based on (10), we provide
a lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth
MT, 1 ≤ k ≤ K , in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: The achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT,
1 ≤ k ≤ K , is bounded below by
Rseck ≥ Rseck =
1
T
∑
t∈{B+1,...,T}
[Rk(t)− CE ]+ , (12)
where Rk(t), 1 ≤ k ≤ K , is the lower bound of the achievable
ergodic rate of the kth MT given in (10) and CE is the ergodic
capacity between the BS and the eavesdropper given in (9).
Proof: The ergodic secrecy rate achieved by the kth MT in
symbol interval t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T } is given by [4, Lemma 1]
Rseck (t) = E
[
[Rk(t)− log2(1 + γE)]+
]≥ [E[Rk(t)]− CE ]+
(a)
≥ [Rk(t)− CE ]+ = Rseck (t), (13)
where Rseck (t) is an achievable lower bound for Rseck (t), and
(a) uses (10). By averaging Rseck (t) over all symbol intervals
t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T } we obtain Lemma 1. This completes the
proof.
CE in (12) is constant for all t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T } as we
made the worst-case assumptions that the eavesdropper employs
ideal hardware and has perfect CSI. The sum in (12) is over
the T − B time slots used for data transmission. Motivated by
the coding scheme for the non-secrecy case in [11], a similar
coding scheme that supports the secrecy rate given in (12) can be
described as follows. For a given t ∈ {B+1, . . . , T }, the statistics
of gk(t) in (11) given the estimate gˆk are identical across all
coherence intervals and the corresponding channel realizations
are i.i.d. Hence, we employ T − B parallel channel codes for
each MT; one code for each time t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T }, i.e., the
tth channel code is employed across the tth time slots of multiple
coherence intervals. Then, at each MT, the tth received symbols
across the multiple coherence intervals are jointly decoded [11].
With this coding strategy the ergodic secrecy rate given in (12)
is achieved provided the parallel codes span sufficiently many
(ideally an infinite number) of independent channel realizations
gk and phase noise samples ψl(t) and φk(t).
B. Asymptotic Analysis of Achievable Rate for MF Precoding
In this subsection, we analyze the lower bound on the achiev-
able ergodic rate of the kth MT, 1 ≤ k ≤ K , in (10) in the
asymptotic limit N,K →∞ for fixed ratio β = K/N . Thereby,
we adopt MF precoding at the BS, i.e., fk = gˆk/‖gˆk‖, as
is commonly done for massive MIMO systems because of the
high complexity of more sophisticated precoder designs. In the
following Lemma, we provide a closed-form expression for the
gain of the desired signal.
Lemma 2: For MF precoding at the BS, the numerator of (11)
reflecting the gain of the desired signal at the kth MT, can be
γk(t) =
p
∣∣E [gHk (t)fk]∣∣2
K∑
l=1
pE
[∣∣gHk (t)fl∣∣2
]
− p
∣∣E [gHk (t)fk]∣∣2 + qE [gHk (t)AAHgk(t)] + ξDL
(11)
expressed as
E
[
gHk Θ
H
k (t)fk
]
=
√
βkNλk · e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2 |t−t0|, (14)
where λk = βkωHk Θσ(t0)Σ
−1Θσ(t0)ωk.
Proof: Please refer to journal version [13, Appendix B].
The term e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2 |t−t0| in (14) reveals the impact of the
accumulated phase noise from the time of channel estimation,
t0, to the time of data transmission, t, on the received signal
strength at MT k. On the other hand, the phase noise within the
training phase affects λk, and consequently the received signal
strength, via Θσ(t0) and Σ, cf. (3), when multiple pilot sequences
are simultaneously emitted. Next, an expression for the multiuser
interference power in the first term of the denominator of (11) is
derived.
Lemma 3: When MF precoding is adopted at the BS, the power
of the multiuser interference caused by the signal intended for
the lth MT, l 6= k, is given by
E
[∣∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)fl
∣∣∣2
]
=
(
βk +
(
X
(1)
k,l +X
(2)
k,l
)(1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
))
,
(15)
where ǫ = e−σ
2
ψ |t−t0|, X
(1)
k,l =
N
No
×
β2kω
H
l Θσ(t0)
Σ
−1
WkΣ
−1
Θσ(t0)
ωl
ω
H
l
Θσ(t0)
Σ−1Θσ(t0)
ωl
and X(2)k,l = N
(
1− 1No
)
×∣∣∣∣βkωHk Θσ(t0)Σ−1Θσ(t0)ωl
∣∣∣∣
2
ω
H
l
Θσ(t0)
Σ−1Θσ(t0)
ωl
.
Proof: Please refer to journal version [13, Appendix C].
Remark 1: Lemma 3 reveals that when the number of BS
antennas is sufficiently large, i.e., N → ∞, the impact of the
multiuser interference from the lth MT grows linearly with N
and does not vanish compared to the strength of the desired signal
in (14) in the limit of N →∞ due to the impairment incurred by
the phase noise during the training phase. Furthermore, although
not obvious, it can be verified that the multiuser interference
decreases with increasing number of LOs, No.
Furthermore, for the summand with l = k in the sum in the
first term of the denominator of (11), we obtain
E
[∣∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)fk
∣∣∣2
]
= βk + βk(N − 1)λk
(
1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
)
, (16)
by applying [13, Theorem 1] from free probability theory [16].
The variance of the gain of the desired signal, gHk Θ
H
k (t)fk, is
obtained by subtracting the right hand side of (16) from the
square of the right hand side of (14).
Finally, the AN leakage incurred by the NS AN precoder is
given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4: For the NS AN precoder, where L = N −K [4],
[6], [12], the AN leakage power received at the kth MT in time
interval t is given by
LkAN = βk(N −K)
((
1− 1
No
)
(1− ǫ) + 1− λk
)
. (17)
Proof: Please refer to journal version [13, Appendix D].
Remark 2: In Lemma 4, the terms ǫ and λk reflect the negative
impact of the hardware impairments on the AN power leakage.
If a common LO is employed, i.e., No = 1, the impact of ǫ
is eliminated. However, the negative effect of ǫ increases as the
number of LOs, No, increases since the phase noise processes
of different LOs are independent destroying the orthogonality
of the columns of A and gk(t), 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Nevertheless, a
common LO does not necessarily result in the maximum secrecy
rate, as the multiuser interference decreases with increasing No,
cf. Remark 1.
Substituting the results in (14)-(17) into (11), the achievable
rate of MT k in time slot t with MF data and NS AN precoding
is obtained as
Rk(t) = log2
(
1 +
λkφN
(ak + ck − βµk)φ+ βµk + ξk
)
, (18)
where
ak =
K∑
l 6=k
(
1 +
(
X
(1)
k,l +X
(2)
k,l
)(1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
)
/βk
)
, (19)
ck =
(
1− 1
No
)
(1− ǫ)+ [(N− 1)λk+1]
(
1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
)
−Nλk,
(20)
λk = λke
−(σ2ψ+σ
2
φ)|t−t0|, µk = (N −
K)
((
1− 1No
)
(1− ǫ) + 1− λk
)
, ξk = β(ξ
DL/(βkPT )),
and β = K/N > 0. Here, ak and ck represent the multiuser
interference received at the kth MT and the variance of the gain
of the desired signal, respectively.
C. Upper Bound on the Eavesdropper’s Capacity
Following [4, Theorem 2], a tight and tractable upper bound
on eavesdropper’s capacity is given by
CE ≤ CE = log2
(
1 +
pNE
q(L−NE)
)
, (21)
for N →∞ and L > NE .
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide numerical and simulation results
to verify the analysis presented in Section III and to illustrate
the impact of phase noise on the ergodic secrecy rate. For
the numerical results, we numerically evaluate the analytical
expression for the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate
obtained by combining (12), (18), and (21). For the simulation
results, we evaluate (12) using Rseck (t) = log2(1 + γk(t)) and
CE = E[log2(1 + γE)] with γk(t) and γE given by (11) and
(9), respectively, by Monte Carlo simulation based on 5, 000
independent channel realizations. In this paper, we adopt spatially
orthogonal pilot sequences of length B = K [13]. An example
for this type of pilot sequences is provided in [10, Eq. (7)].
For simplicity, in this section, we assume the path-losses for
all MTs are identical, i.e., βk = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K , and the
coherence block length is equal to T = 500 time slots. Typical
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Fig. 1. Achievable ergodic secrecy rate vs. φ for a system with N = 128,
σψ = σφ = 6
◦
, NE = 4, pτ = PT /K , and PT = 10 dB.
values for the phase noise increment standard deviations, σψ
,σφ, used include 0.06◦, which was adopted in the long-term
evolution (LTE) specifications [14], and 6◦, which corresponds
to strong phase noise according to [15]. The specific values of
other adopted system parameters are provided in the captions of
the figures.
Fig. 1 shows the achievable ergodic secrecy rate as a function
of the power allocation parameter φ for different numbers of
deployed LOs (No = 1, 128) and different numbers of MTs (K =
4, 32) for the case of strong phase noise (σφ = σψ = 6◦). We
observe that distributed LOs (No = N ) outperform a common
LO (No = 1) for most values of φ, because the desired signal
power is independent of No, while the multiuser interference
power is reduced when distributed LOs are deployed, cf. Lemma
2 and Remark 1. This is in accordance with the observation made
in [10] for the MTs’ achievable rate. On the other hand, for small
values of φ, a common LO is able to achieve a similar (or even
slightly higher) secrecy rate as distributed LOs. This is because
the AN leakage, represented by µk in (18), increases in No, and
becomes dominant when a large amount of power is assigned for
AN emission, cf. Remark 2.
Fig. 2 depicts the achievable ergodic secrecy rate as a function
of the phase noise standard deviation σψ = σφ for different
numbers of eavesdropper antennas. The cases of a common LO
and distributed LOs are considered. As expected, the secrecy rate
is monotonically decreasing in the phase noise variance as well
as in NE . Strong phase noise degrades the MTs’ achievable rate,
while a larger number of eavesdropper antennas improve Eve’s
capacity. Both effects are detrimental to the achievable secrecy
rate. Furthermore, this figure also suggests that distributed LOs
achieve a higher secrecy rate compared to a common LO when
the optimal φ∗ maximizing the secrecy rate is employed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of multiplicative
phase noise on the secrecy performance of downlink massive
MIMO systems employing MF data precoding and NS AN
precoding at the BS. For the considered system, a closed-form
lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the users
was derived. This bound can be used to obtain insights regarding
the impact of system parameters, such as the number of LOs and
the phase noise variances, on system performance. Our analytical
and simulation results revealed that distributively deployed LOs
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Fig. 2. Achievable ergodic secrecy rate vs. phase noise standard deviation
σψ = σφ for a system with K = 4 , N = 128, pτ = PT /K , and PT = 10
dB. The optimal φ = φ∗ maximizing the secrecy rate is adopted.
can achieve a better performance than one common LO as long
as the power assigned for data transmission is sufficiently large.
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